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PROSECUTING JUVENILES IN





Advocates of a traditional and separate system of juvenile jus-
tice have been sharply critical both of judicial decisions handed
down during the past two decades that have granted juveniles a
broadened set of due process rights and of sweeping legislative
modifications in juvenile law that have diminished the discretionary
powers of the juvenile court while expanding the powers of prosecu-
tors who wish to pursue cases involving juveniles in criminal rather
than juvenile courts. It is argued that this combination of judicial
decisions and legislative enactments will dismantle the juvenile jus-
tice system and subject juveniles to the risk of harsh treatment by
criminal courts that increasingly are committed to retributive rather
than rehabilitative goals.'
* The authors gratefully acknowledge comments on an earlier version of this Article
provided by Barry Feld, Professor of Law at the University of Minnesota School of Law,
Marvin E. Wolfgang, Professor of Criminology at the University of Pennsylvania, Ms.
Cynthia A. Wilson, Northwestern University, School of Law, and Don Royston, Assistant
State Attorney in the Juvenile Division of Florida's 8th Judicial Circuit, and the data
coding and computer work done by Ms. Sharon Aley, Research Assistant, Center for
Studies in Criminology and Law, University of Florida. The opinions and conclusions
contained in this Article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the view
of the State Attorney's Office of Florida's 11thJudicial Circuit.
** Professor of Criminology and Sociology and Director, Center for Studies in Crimi-
nology and Law, University of Florida. Ph.D., University of Kentucky, 1971; M.A., Uni-
versity of Kentucky, 1969; B.S., McMurry College, 1966.
* * * Chief Assistant State Attorney for Administration for Florida's 11th Judicial Cir-
cuit. J.D., University of Florida College of Law, 1977; B.A., University of Florida, 1975.
1 This is not the appropriate place for us to join the debate now taking place be-
tween a growing number of scholars and legislative bodies who favor assigning a signifi-
cant priority to retributive goals while granting no more than secondary importance to
rehabilitative objectives. Two points, however, must be made. First, a rekindling of
interest in retributive theories of punishment has had massive effects on the sentencing
policies of a large number of states. While rehabilitative and/or such utilitarian goals as
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No fewer than two fairly distinct groups, however, have rejected
some or all of the arguments advanced by these critics. One group
includes what can be thought of as "due process liberals." Never
content with the informality of juvenile court proceedings and the
consequent inattentiveness to the due process rights of juveniles,
those in this group strongly supported judicial decisions that were
aimed at expanding the legal rights of juveniles. 2 While not neces-
sarily claiming that the separate juvenile justice system should be
abolished altogether, these due process liberals remain firmly con-
vinced that rules of law and procedure governing the operation of
juvenile courts should not be substantially different from those
found within the adversarial context of criminal courts.
The second group, which can be referred to as "crime control
conservatives," attacks those supporting the traditional version of a
separate juvenile justice system in a very different manner. At the
core of their position is a belief that substantial numbers ofjuvenile
offenders, especially those who are approaching adulthood, who
deterrence and incapacitation once dominated legislative statements of the purposes of
punishment, today we commonly find primacy being assigned to retributive concepts.
Typical of this trend is clear language in the Arizona Revised Statutes Annotated which
states that the purpose of criminal sentencing is "to impose just and deserved punish-
ment on those whose conduct threatens the public peace." ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-
101(6) (1978). This "return to retributivism" is not unrelated to the concerns of this
Article. The notion that culpable offenders who have harmed others should-indeed
must-receive their just deserts has encouraged many to lobby for the prosecution of
juveniles in criminal courts. Only then, it is argued, will we have access to sentencing
options that are meaningful in terms of retributively-based specifications of desert.
Second, however, it is exceedingly important to recognize that the translation of
retributive theories into sentencing policies is both a logical and an empirical impossibil-
ity. Retributive theories cannot and do not provide any guidance whatsoever regarding
either the specific sentence or the range of sentences that equals the just desert of any
offender. See, e.g., N. MORRIS, MADNESS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (1982); C. THOMAS,
CORRECTIONS IN AMERICA (1986); Bedau, Classification-Based Sentencing: Some Conceptual
and Ethical Problems, 10 NEW ENG.J. CRIM. & CIv. CONFINEMENT 1 (1984); Bedau, Retribu-
tion and the Theory of Punishment, 75 J. PHIL. 601 (1978). Consequently, any desire to
extend the reach of retributive justice to juvenile offenders is inherently doomed to fail-
ure. Just as retributive theories provide no guidance of any tangible value regarding
what sentence ought be imposed on an adult offender, these theories cannot be relied
upon when judicial dispositions are accorded juvenile offenders in either juvenile or
criminal courts.
2 See, e.g., Breed v.Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975) (holding that doublejeopardy protec-
tions apply to criminal proceedings subsequent to adjudicatory hearings in juvenile
courts); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (holding that standard of proof in delin-
quency hearings must meet a beyond reasonable doubt standard); In re Gault, 387 U.S.
1 (1967) (holding that delinquency hearings must guarantee such due process rights as
timely notice, right to counsel, right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, and pro-
tection against self-incrimination); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966) (holding
that decision to transfer to adult court is a critical phase of processing at which right to
due process attaches).
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have significant records of prior delinquency, and/or whose
presenting offenses involve serious felonies, are "precocious
criminals." They thus advance the belief that such serious juvenile
offenders should be removed from the jurisdiction of the juvenile
court and prosecuted as adults. 3 This removal, they hypothesize,
simultaneously will serve the goal of retributive justice (by guaran-
teeing that juveniles will receive their "just deserts") and the utilita-
rian goals of general deterrence, specific deterrence, and
incapacitation. 4
Both of these "pure" positions, of course, encourage us to im-
agine that our methods of responding to the unlawful conduct of
juveniles will reflect a complete adoption of a single model ofjuve-
nile justice. Experience in the everyday world ofjuvenile and crimi-
nal justice yields conclusive evidence that we seldom pursue the
creation or the application of law in so pristine a fashion. In this
analysis, therefore, the authors will move beyond the rhetoric of
those who have entered into what appears to be more of a philo-
sophical than a legal debate. The discussion will be divided into
several more or less independent sections. The Article will begin
with an overview of relevant information regarding the historical or-
igins of granting juveniles some type of special treatment. This por-
tion of our analysis will demonstrate first, that the traditional
defense for the informal and often arbitrary procedures of our sepa-
3 It should be noted that efforts by crime control conservatives to remove serious
juvenile offenders from the jurisdiction of the juvenile court have been matched by even
more vigorous efforts by due process liberals who have sought to remove status offend-
ers from the jurisdiction of these courts. In this context, the term "status offender"
refers to juveniles who have been charged with offenses for which no adult could be
charged (i.e., truancy, being beyond control of parents, etc.). The success of this effort
is reflected in the passage of pertinent portions of the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention Act of 1974 (Pub. L. No. 93-415, 93d Congress, S. 821, Sept. 7, 1974,
§ 223(a)(12)) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 5601, et. seq.). The JJDP Act called for, among
other things, an end to the incarceration of all status offenders. At least one jurisdic-
tion-the State of Washington-has exceeded this demand by removing all status of-
fenders from the jurisdictional reach of its juvenile courts. See A. SCHNEIDER & D.
SCHRAM, AN ASSESSMENT OF JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM IN WASHINGTON STATE (1983).
Pressure to move in the direction of full decriminalization of all status offenses and the
removal of all status offenders from the jurisdiction of juvenile courts continues to
mount. See, e.g., W. WADLINGTON, C. WHITEBREAD & S. DAVIS, CHILDREN IN THE LEGAL
SySTEM 602 (1983); Logan & Rausch, Why Deinstitutionalization of Status Offenders Is Point-
ess, 31 CRIME & DELINQ. 501 (1985).
4 See supra note 1 regarding defects in retributive theories. Regarding utilitarian
objectives of punishment, a reasonable assessment of recent empirical evidence pro-
vides no more than very modest support for the hypothesis that punishment enhances
our ability to prevent either adult crime orjuvenile delinquency. See, e.g., DETERRENCE &
INCAPACITATION: ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF CRIMINAL SANCTIONS ON CRIME RATES (A.
Blumstein, J. Cohen & D. Nagin eds. 1978).
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rate system ofjuvenilejustice which relies upon the presumed parens
patriae powers of the State is fundamentally flawed in terms of its
historical adequacy, and second, that opposition to legal policies
which diminish or eliminate altogether the due process rights of
juveniles is rooted in a tradition that reaches back at least as far as
the beginnings of efforts to create a separate juvenile justice system.
Attention then will shift to how and why the contemporary de-
bate became so heated. Special attention will be given to a combi-
nation of judicial decisions that expanded the due process rights of
juveniles and to legislative and judicial reactions to those decisions
which had the effect of limiting the reach of those expanded due
process rights. However, it also will be recognized that recent deci-
sions of the United States Supreme Court raise pointed questions
regarding the willingness of the Court to protect the due process
ground that arguably was gained during the late 1960's and early
1970's.
Finally, the Article will discuss significant features of Florida's
juvenile law and, by drawing on a large body of empirical data de-
rived from the case files of the Dade County (Miami) State Attor-
ney's Office, the manner in which that law is applied in one major
metropolitan jurisdiction. The Article will conclude with a discus-
sion of the implications this work may have for the future ofjuvenile
law in Florida and, by extension, significant numbers of other juris-
dictions that have made adjustments in their juvenile law similar to
those made in Florida.
II. AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF JUVENILE
LAW AND THE JUVENILE COURT
A. EARLY DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN JUVENILES AND ADULTS
It is difficult, if not impossible, to identify precisely the point in
legal history at which devising some distinctive means of dealing
with juvenile offenders emerged. The earliest legal codes, for exam-
ple, describe significant numbers of circumstances that could result
in juveniles being held liable and confronting very harsh punish-
ments. In the Code of Hammurabi, which appears to be the earliest
example of written law, one can find such illustrations as "If a son
has struck his father, his hands shall be cut off," and "If the son of a
Nersega, or the son of a devotee, to his foster father or his foster
mother, has said 'Thou are not my father,' or 'Thou are not my
mother,' his tongue shall be cut out."5 Similarly, Hebrew law, as
5 The Code of Hammurabi is only partly informative in this regard. Few of its provi-
sions contain language that is of relevance regarding the age of offenders, and the few
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reflected in Exodus, Deuteronomy, and Leviticus, reflects a willingness to
deal harshly with juveniles, including those who engaged in conduct
for which no adult would have been liable. For example, in Deuteron-
omy it is noted that "[i]f a man has a stubborn and rebellious son
who will not obey the voice of his father or the voice of his mother
... then his father and his mother shall take hold of him and bring
him to the elders of his city ... [and] all the men of the city shall
stone him to death with stones." 6
Notwithstanding this apparent willingness in some ancient bod-
ies of law to deal harshly with juvenile offenders and obvious illus-
trations of how some of this law directly influenced law in the
United States during the Colonial Period,7 the foundations for legal
policies that define juveniles as a special category of persons are
more directly linked to developments in English common law, espe-
cially the diversification that marked the maturing structure of Eng-
lish courts during the Middle Ages and thereafter. The goal of
clarity, though not necessarily of precision, is served by dealing with
these two developments as though one reflects a concern with prin-
ciples of substantive criminal law and the other as though it were
more closely linked with judicial administration.
With regard to substantive criminal law, we must note the will-
ingness of English criminal courts to accept infancy or immaturity as
a legal excuse.8 This defense was not available immediately after
the Norman Conquest in 1066. The seeds for such a defense, how-
ever, do appear to have been sown by that early point in English
judicial history via indications of a willingness to excuse the other-
wise criminal conduct of, in the language of that period, "lunatics."
For example, Rollin Perkins and Ronald Boyce have observed:
By the time of Henry III (1216-1272) it was not uncommon for the
king to grant a pardon as a special act of grace for one who had com-
mitted homicide while of unsound mind, and in the reign of Edward I
(1272-1307) although there was no change in the theory of guilt as a
strict matter of law, such a homicide was regarded as pardonable to
the extent that it entitled the defendant to a special verdict saying he
committed the crime while mad and this practically insured the issu-
ance of a pardon, which in time came to be granted as a matter of
that could be relevant are subject to differing translations. But see THE OLDEST CODE OF
LAWS IN THE WORLD: THE CODE OF LAWs PROMULGATED BY HAMMURABI, KING OF BABY-
LON, B.C. 2285-2242 (C. Johns trans. 1903).
6 Deuteronomy 21:18-21.
7 Numerous examples may be found in the 1641 MASSACHUSETTS BODY OF
LIBERTIES.
8 See, e.g., P. LOW, J.JEFFRIES & R. BONNIE, CRIMINAL LAW 628 (1982); R. PERKINS &




Clearly, then, early recognition was given to the possibility that
courts could and should excuse the conduct of those who did not
appreciate the wrongfulness of their actions. Precisely when such
notions began to shape common law standards regarding the culpa-
bility of juveniles is not altogether clear. However, it generally is
agreed that this development took place by no later than the four-
teenth century.' 0
The basic common law standards governing the defense of in-
fancy or immaturity are easily summarized.' 1 Children below the
age of seven were said to lack any criminal capacity (i.e., mens rea).
No evidence in support of a contrary position was admissible.
There was a conclusive presumption that a child was doli incapax.
Between the ages of seven and fourteen, however, a rebuttable pre-
sumption of incapacity existed. Thus, practically speaking, the
nearer a child was to adulthood (i.e., fourteen years of age), the eas-
ier it became to introduce convincing evidence that the juvenile of-
fender should be handled as a responsible adult rather than as a
child who lacked any criminal capacity. Those who were fourteen
years of age or older had no right to raise infancy or immaturity as a
defense. They were presumed to be doli capax and thus fully respon-
sible for their conduct. Consequently, absent some other means of
contending that they lacked criminal capacity (e.g., the insanity de-
fense), they were dealt with as fully responsible adults. 12
The changing nature of the structure of the early English judi-
cial system is of far greater importance than is the substantive crimi-
9 R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra note 8, at 950.
10 See, e.g., R. CALDWELL & J. BLACK, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY 186, 200 (1971); A.
PLA-r, THE CHILD SAVERS: THE INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY (1969); Caldwell, The Juve-
nile Court: Its Development and Some Major Problems, 51J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE
Sc. 493 (1961); Fox,Juvenilejustice Reform: An Historical Perspective, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1187
(1970).
11 See S. Fox, THE LAW OFJUVENILE COURTS IN A NUTSHELL 21, 35 (1977); R. PERKINS
& R. BOYCE, supra note 8, at 936. See also Godfrey v. State, 31 Ala. 323 (1858); Dove v.
State, 37 Ark. 261 (1881); Angelo v. People, 96 Ill. 209 (1880); Willet v. State, 76 Ky. (13
Bush) 230 (1877).
12 This, of course, is something of an overstatement in the sense that colonial and
post-colonial period sentencing practices appear to have shielded most juveniles from
especially harsh dispositions and included such "creative sentencing alternatives" as
lengthy apprenticeships in lieu of strict reliance upon more traditional penal sanctions.
See, e.g., P. LOW, J.JEFFRIES & R. BONNIE, supra note 8, at 629. On the other hand, it also
is true that at least 287 juveniles were executed between 1642 and the present-l2 of
these executions involving children below the age of fourteen. Strieb, The American
Experience with Capital Punishment, 36 OKLA. L. REV. 613, 619 (1983). A perplexing aspect
of these execution statistics is that 66.90 percent (N= 192) of them took place after a
separate system ofjuvenile justice had begun to take form in the United States (i.e., they
are post-1899 executions).
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nal law to anyone who wishes to understand the foundations of the
juvenile justice system that was to emerge in the United States dur-
ing the nineteenth century. It is also a topic that is difficult to deal
with in a summary fashion.13 Nevertheless, those with interests in
the history of law will recall that distinctions between what we now
think of as legislative, executive, and judicial functions were far from
clear during the period immediately following the Norman Con-
quest in 1066. Though some judicial powers continued to be exer-
cised by, for example, the shire court and the hundred court, many,
if not most, of these powers were vested in the King and his closest
advisors (the Curia Regis). Furthermore, until at least the time of
Henry II (1154-1189), distinctions between civil and criminal
wrongs were anything but precise.
However, as the monarchy began to consolidate its political
power, at least partly via the contention that criminal offenses were
wrongs committed against the State as well as wrongs committed
against individuals, the development of an increasingly specialized
system of courts became both a necessary way of resolving disputes
and an important means of expanding the power of the State. Thus,
powers initially vested only in the King and the Curia Regis gradually
began to attach to several specialized courts: the Court of Excheq-
uer of Pleas, largely an innovation designed to guarantee that pay-
ments of taxes and various fees would be made on a timely basis; the
Court of Common Pleas, primarily a court within which civil dis-
putes were handled; the Court of King's Bench, which served both
as a criminal court and an appellate court that reviewed cases
originating in the Court of Common Pleas; and the Court of Chan-
cery, which in some ways may be thought of as a special court that
sought remedies for cases that could not be resolved in an equitable
manner by other types of courts, especially the Court of Common
Pleas. 14
Certainly the most important of these courts, given the pur-
poses of this discussion, were the chancery courts. While the origins
of these courts in the role of the chancellor as the most powerful of
the King's advisors may be found soon after the Norman Conquest,
it generally is said that a separate chancery court did not exist until
13 But see H. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL
TRADITION (1983); J. GOEBEL, FELONY AND MISDEMEANOR: A STUDY IN THE HISTORY OF
CRIMINAL LAW (Univ. of Pa. Paperback ed. 1976); F. KEMPIN, HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION
TO ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW (1973) [hereinafter cited as F. KEMPIN, HISTORICAL INTRODUC-
TION]; F. KEMPIN, LEGAL HISTORY: LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE (1963) [hereinafter cited as
F. KEMPIN, LEGAL HISTORY].
14 See, e.g., F. KEMPIN, HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION, supra note 13, at 22; F. KEMPIN,
LEGAL HISTORY, supra note 13, at 1; C.G. POST, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAw 18 (1963).
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1474.15 Historical concerns aside, there are two important linkages
between the early chancery courts and the structure of more mod-
ern juvenile courts.
First, it was within these chancery courts that we find the clear-
est initial assertions of the parens patriae powers and responsibilities
of the State (i.e., the idea that the State has the right and perhaps
the responsibility to intervene on behalf of those of its citizens who,
by virtue of youthfulness or other evidence of an inability to care for
themselves, require that the State act as a surrogate parent).' 6
Although it will later become obvious that a vastly different meaning
subsequently was attributed to the term, this parens patriae power was
to provide the cornerstone for far later reform efforts in the United
States.
Second, and quite significantly, the early chancery courts lacked
the formality and rigidity of other English courts.17 They were rela-
tively informal in their operation and, equally important, endowed
with the power to create new and unusual legal remedies rather than
simply applying older law to new cases. At the same time, however,
it should be understood that the issues coming before these courts
concerned "property, guardianship, and the arrangement of people,
property, and power in relation to the monarchy."18 Moreover, the
chancery courts neither had nor sought jurisdiction over criminal
cases involving either juvenile or adult offenders. In some ways,
therefore, it is ironic that so many continue to see the powers and
procedures of the early chancery courts as providing a firm founda-
tion for the creation of contemporary juvenile law. 19
B. CHANGING PATTERNS OF REACTIONS TO JUVENILE OFFENDERS:
THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE AND EXPERIMENT
At least in part because of the impact of British common law on
15 F. KEMPIN, LEGAL HISTORY, supra note 13, at 19.
16 Id. It should be noted that the present use of this parens patriae power reaches well
beyond situations involving children charged with criminal or delinquenct acts and into
situations involving, for example, parental refusals to provide medical treatment for
their children, child abuse, child labor laws, and compulsory education laws. For a re-
cent consideration of these and related issues, see CHILDREN, MENTAL HEALTH, AND THE
LAW (N. Reppucci, L. Weithorn, E. Mulvey &J. Monahan eds. 1984).
17 See J. CAREY & P. MCANANY, INTRODUCTION TO JUVENILE DELINQUENCY: YOUTi
AND THE LAw 54, 59 (1984).
18 Rendleman, Parens Patriae : From Chancery to the Juvenile Court, in JUVENILE JUSTICE
AND PHILOSOPHY 58, 60 (F. Faust & P. Brantingham eds. 1979). See also Cogan, Before
and After the Entrance of "Parens Patriae," 22 S.C.L. REV. 147 (1970); Rendleman, Parens
Patriae: From Chanceiy to the Juvenile Court, 23 S.C.L. REV. 205 (1971).
19 See, e.g., THE CHILDREN OF ISHMAEL: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON JUVENILE JUSTICE
14, 18 (B. Krisberg &J. Austin eds. 1978).
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the legal system developed in America during the Colonial Period,
some of the earliest American legal documents explicitly recognize
the age of those alleged to have violated the law. Reflecting both
this fact and the linkage between some colonial law to language
found in the Old Testament, for example, one of the provisions in
the 1641 Massachusetts Body of Liberties contains the following:
If any child, or children, above sixteen years of age, and of sufficient under-
standing, shall curse or smite their natural father or mother, he or they
shall be put to death, unless it can be sufficiently testified that the Par-
ents have been very unchristianly negligent in the education of such
children: so provoked them by extreme and cruel correction, that they
have been forced thereunto, to preserve themselves from death or
maiming.20
Realistically, however, the roots of the reform movement are
associated most directly with the establishment of houses of refuge
in Massachusetts, New York, and Pennsylvania between 1824 and
1828.21 While there is considerable evidence of earlier exploratory
efforts aimed at fashioning special methods of handling juveniles,
particularly in Europe, the houses of refuge appear to have been the
first public facilities established exclusively for juveniles22-though
it should be understood that those committed to this and similar
institutions by early courts were most commonly children who today
would be placed in a "status offender" (i.e., beyond control of par-
ents, vagrant, runaways, etc.) rather than a delinquent category. 23
Suffice it to say that the initial innovation represented by the
houses of refuge was not universally appreciated, largely because
20 MASSACHUSETTS BODY OF LIBERTIES, quoted in B. Krisberg & J. Austin, supra note
19, at 12 (emphasis added).
21 H. BARNES, THE EVOLUTION OF PENOLOGY IN PENNSYLVANIA (1927);J. HAWES, CHIL-
DREN IN URBAN SOCIETY (1971); B. KRISBERG &J. AUSTIN, supra note 19; R. MENNELL,
THORNS AND THISTLES: JUVENILE DELINQUENTS IN THE STATES, 1825-1940 (1973); R.
PICKETT, HOUSE OF REFUGE: ORIGINS OF JUVENILE REFORM IN NEW YORK STATE, 1815-
1857 (1969); A. PLATT, supra note 10; D. ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM:
SOCIAL ORDER AND DISORDER IN THE NEW REPUBLIC (1971); S. SCHLOSSMAN, LOVE AND
THE AMERICAN DELINQUENT: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF "PROGRESSIVE" JUVENILE
JusTIcE, 1825-1920 (1977); Sutton, Social Structure, Institutions, and the Legal Status of Chil-
dren in the United States, 88 AM.J. Soc. 915 (1983); Sutton, Stubborn Children: Law and the
Socialization of Deviance in the Puritan Colonies, 15 FAM. L. Q. 31 (1981).
22 It is claimed that the New York City House of Refuge was the first public facility
that was designed specifically for those we would now refer to as either delinquents or
dependent/neglected children. For more thorough reviews of these and earlier devel-
opments see T. ERIKSSON, THE REFORMERS: AN HISTORICAL SURVEY OF PIONEER EXPERI-
MENTS IN THE TREATMENT OF CRIMINALS (1976); B. MCKELVEY, AMERICAN PRISONS: A
HISTORY OF GOOD INTENTIONS (1977); A. PLA4rr, supra note 10; Fox, supra note 10; Teitel-
baum & Harris, Some Historical Perspectives on Governmental Regulation of Children and Parents,
in L. TEITELBAUM & A. GOUGH, BEYOND CONTROL: STATUS OFFENDERS IN THE JUVENILE
COURT 1 (1977).
23 Teitelbaum & Harris, supra note 22, at 1.
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courts which committed children to these institutions often did so in
a way that reflected little regard for due process rights. Constitu-
tional challenges were thus quick to materialize. Perhaps the earli-
est illustration of this criticism is provided by Ex parte Crouse.24
Based on a complaint by her mother which alleged that Mary Ann
Crouse was an incorrigible child, Mary Ann was detained in the Phil-
adelphia House of Refuge. Contending that his daughter should
not have been committed to the House of Refuge without a prior
exercise of her right to a trial by jury, her father challenged the con-
stitutional basis of Mary Ann's commitment. However, raising the
parens patriae power of the State as a legitimation for its holding, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court observed: "The infant has been
snatched from a course which must have ended in confirmed de-
pravity; and, not only is the restraint of her person lawful, but it
would be an act of extreme cruelty to release her from it."25 Simi-
larly, in Farnham v. Pierce,26 the Massachusetts Supreme Court de-
fended the deprivation of due process rights by holding that a
challenged statute
is not a penal statute, and the commitment to the public officers is not
in the nature of punishment. It is a provision by the Commonwealth,
as parens patriae, for the custody and care of neglected children, and is
intended only to supply to them the parental custody which they have
lost.... It does not punish the infant by confinement, nor deprive him
of his liberty; it only recognizes and regulates, as in providing for
guardianship and apprenticeship, the parental custody which is an in-
cident of infancy.27
The roots of a separate juvenile justice system, with their ori-
gins in the English chancery courts, thus found fertile soil in the
United States long before the considerably later creation of separate
juvenile courts. Indeed, there are numerous indications that some-
thing akin to a separate court system emerged in some jurisdictions
before the well-known Illinois legislation of 1899.28 For example,
Massachusetts designed special probation provisions for juvenile of-
24 4 Whart. 9 (Pa. 1838). As additional examples of judicial willingness to assert a
variety of parens patriae power that appears to have had no foundation beyond the novel
claim asserted by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Crouse, see Ex parte Sharpe, 16
Idaho 120, 96 P. 563 (1908); In re Ferrier's Petition, 103 Ill. 367 (1882); County of
McClean v. Humphreys, 104 111. 378 (1882); Roth v. House of Refuge, 31 Md. 329
(1869); Farnham v. Pierce, 141 Mass. 203, 6 N.E. 830 (1886); Commonwealth v. Fisher,
213 Pa. 48, 62 A. 198 (1905); Milwaukee Industrial School v. Supervisors, 40 Wis. 328
(1876).
25 Crouse, 4 Whart. at 11-12.
26 141 Mass. 203, 6 N.E. 830 (1886).
27 Id. at 204, 6 N.E. at 831.
28 Illinois Juvenile Court Act, § 1, 1899, Ill. Laws 131 (repealed 1965).
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fenders by 1869, and in 1870, Massachusetts provided separate
hearings for juveniles in Suffolk County. 29 Similarly, by 1877, New
York law required that juvenile and adult offenders be separated
from one another in its courts and penal institutions and, in 1892,
New York law called for separate trials for children below the age of
eighteen.30 Thus, a lengthy and often complicated history pre-
dated the establishment of juvenile courts in the State of Illinois in
1899. 31
By way of a brief overview of the period between 1899 and the
mid-1960's, however, two points warrant particular emphasis. First,
juvenile courts did not develop in any highly specific fashion after
1899.32 Some courts were separated entirely from other courts of
limited or of general jurisdiction. Some of them were granted ex-
clusive jurisdiction over all matters--dependency, neglect, and de-
linquency-involving persons below some age defined by statutory
law. More often, juvenile courts and criminal courts had concurrent
jurisdiction over significant numbers of juveniles who were alleged
to have engaged in unlawful conduct. Whether as a matter of tech-
nical legal definitions regarding jurisdiction or as a matter of pre-
vailing legal practice, however, the vast majority of delinquency
cases in the United States quickly came to fall within the reach of
juvenile rather than criminal courts.3 3 Moreover, the jurisdictional
reach of these courts soon became a power of the juvenile court that
it effectively sought to retain. It most commonly did so by asserting
its right to determine whether juvenile cases should or should not
be moved to the jurisdiction of criminal courts (i.e., transfer ofjuris-
diction after a waiver hearing held within the juvenile court). In-
deed, "to waive" a case became the legal equivalent to admitting
that the rehabilitative efforts and potential of the juvenile justice sys-
tem were impotent. Thus, the burden of proof placed on those who
sought a transfer of jurisdiction became substantial. They had to
provide convincing evidence that the child was not amenable to
treatment as ajuvenile and that he or she would constitute a danger-
29 p. TAPPAN, CRIME, JUSTICE AND CORRECTION 388 (1960).
30 Id.
31 See supra note 28.
32 See H. RUBIN, THE COURTS: FULCRUM OF THEJUSTICE SYSTEM 79 (1983).
33 This trend is well-illustrated by the changes in relevant New Jersey statutes re-
viewed by P. LOW, J.JEFFRIES & R. BONNIE, supra note 8, at 647. Statutes passed in 1903
and 1912 limited the powers of its juvenile courts by excluding murder and manslaugh-
ter from the jurisdiction of these courts. This limitation was removed in 1929, and in
1935 legislation passed which described "a person under the age of 16 [as being
deemed] incapable of commiting a crime." Id. For a frequently discussed ramification
of this expansion of the jurisdictional powers of New Jersey's juvenile courts, see State v.
Monahan, 15 N.J. 34, 104 A.2d 21 (1954).
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ous threat to the community were his or her case to be disposed of
within the juvenile justice system.34
Second, as the juvenile justice system developed in the United
States, its advocates claimed a special exception from the constitu-
tional restraints that applied to criminal courts. On the one hand,
they consistently legitimized their intervention into the lives of
juveniles with repeated references to the parens patriae powers and
responsibilities of the State (conveniently ignoring, of course, that
in the English origins of such powers and responsibilities they had
little if anything to do with behavior that was in violation of the pro-
visions of criminal law).3 5 On the other hand, they were swift to join
those who, during the last quarter of the nineteenth century, argued
that criminal behavior did not reflect a conscious choice made by a
rational actor and that, instead, it was an overt reflection of some
force or forces over which individuals had little or no controlA6
Crime, most particularly crimes committed by juveniles, came to be
seen as something very closely akin to the way we view disease.3 7
Disease, of course, is to be treated rather than punished. Moreover,
the treatment of disease is said to require individualized diagnosis,
flexibility in the development of an appropriate treatment plan, and,
sometimes, periods of isolation or quarantine that bear little or no
relationship to the legal seriousness of, in effect, symptoms. The
fact that pitifully little criminological evidence or theory supports
such a "medicalization of delinquency" or the ability of the juvenile
justice system effectively to provide for a "cure" for delinquency
was and often continues to be ignored by those who confidently as-
34 See, e.g., Feld,Juvenile Court Legislative Reform and the Serious Young Offender: Disman-
fling the "Rehabilitative Ideal ," 65 MINN. L. REV. 167 (1981); Feld, Reference ofJuvenile Of-
fenders for Adult Prosecution: The Legislative Alternative to Asking Unanswerable Questions, 62
MINN. L. REV. 515 (1978).
35 Early cases are replete with language that suggests that juveniles lack due process
rights when they encounter the State in its capacity as parens patriae. The end, early
courts commonly contended, justifies the deprivation of virtually all constitutional rights
that juveniles might assert in other contexts. Consider, for example, especially clear
language in Commonwealth v. Fisher, 213 Pa. 48, 62 A. 198 (1905) that drew favorable
comment in the frequently cited case of Exparte Sharpe, 16 Idaho 120, 96 P. 563 (1908):
"To save a child from becoming a criminal ... the Legislature surely may provide
for the salvation of such a child... by bringing it into one of the courts of the state
without any process at all .... When the child gets there, and the court, with the
power to save it, determines on its salvation, and not its punishment, it is immaterial
how it got there."
Id. at 127-28, 96 P. at 564 (quoting Fisher, 213 Pa. at 53, 62 A. at 200) (emphasis added).
36 See, e.g., G. NETrLER, ExPLAINING CRIME (3d ed. 1984); THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY
(T. Bernard 2d ed. 1979) (G. Vold 1st ed. 1958); C. THOMAS & J. HEPBURN, CRIME,
CRIMINAL LAW, AND CRIMINOLOGY (1983).
37 For a general overview of this and related issues, see P. CONRAD & J. SCHNEIDER,
DEVIANCE AND MEDICALIZATION: FROM BADNESS TO SICKNESS (1980).
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sert the reasonableness of a very separate and a very different sys-
tem of juvenile justice.38
III. CONTEMPORARY DEVELOPMENTS IN RELEVANT JUVENILE LAW
During the period immediately following the establishment of
the first juvenile courts in Illinois in 1899, the considerable popular-
ity of the proposals advanced by those who urged the State to exer-
cise its parens patriae powers to legitimize the creation of a separate
juvenile justice system had massive effects on the administration of
justice in the United States.39 By 1912, for example, juvenile courts
had been established in no fewer than twenty-two states. By 1925,
juvenile courts existed in all but two states: Maine and Wyoming.
The reform movement proved to be completely successful by 1945.
By that time every jurisdiction in the nation, including that of the
federal government, had created some type of juvenile court.40
Much the same can be said of the success of this reform movement
in other countries. For example, within no more than a quarter of a
century after the passage of the initial legislation in Illinois, virtually
all European jurisdictions had made major changes in their methods
of dealing with juveniles who were alleged to have violated the pro-
visions of criminal law.4 '
Largely because advocates of a system of more or less in-
dependent juvenile courts contended that such courts should enjoy
very broad discretionary powers and that they should not be charac-
38 G. KASSEBAUM, D. WARD & D. WILNER, PRISON TREATMENT AND PAROLE SURVIVAL:
AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT (1971); P. LERMAN, COMMUNITY TREATMENT AND SOCIAL
CONTROL (1975); D. LIPTON, R. MARTINSON &J. WILEs, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CORREC-
TIONAL TREATMENT: A SURVEY OF TREATMENT EVALUATION STUDIES (1975); Bailey, Cor-
rectional Outcome: An Evaluation of 100 Reports, 57 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE
ScI. 153 (1966); Ketcham, The Unfulfilled Promise of the American Juvenile Court, inJUSTICE
FOR THE CHILD: THE JUVENILE COURT IN TRANSITION 22 (M. Rosenheim ed. 1962); Rie-
del & Thornberry, The Effectiveness of Correctional Programs: An Assessment of the Field, in B.
KRISBERG & J. AUSTIN, supra note 19, at 418; Robison & Smith, The Effectiveness of Correc-
tional Programs, 17 CRIME & DELINq. 67 (1971).
39 See, e.g., J. CAREY & P. MCANANY, INTRODUCTION TOJUVENILE DELINQUENCY: YOUTH
AND THE LAW 255, 285 (1984); H. LOU, JUVENILE COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES (1927);
C. SIMONSEN & M. GORDON, JUVENILE JUSTICE IN AMERICA 170, 200 (1982); P. TAPPAN,
CRIME, JUSTICE, AND CORRECTION 387, 401 (1960); Chute, The Juvenile Court in Retrospect,
FED. PROBATION, Sept. 1949, at 3.
40 See Krisberg & Austin, History of the Control and Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency in
America, in B. KRISBERG &J. AUSTIN, supra note 19, at 7; Rubin, The Juvenile Courts, in H.
RUBIN, THE COURTS: FULCRUM OF THEJUSTICE SYSTEM 79 (1983); Teitelbaum & Harris,
supra note 22.
41 Relevant laws were enancted soon after the Illinois initiative in, for example, Great
Britain (1908), France (1912), Belgium (1912), Hungary (1913), Spain (1918), and Ger-
many (1923). See UNITED STATES CHILDREN'S BUREAU, JUVENILE COURT LAWS IN FOREIGN
COUNTRIES, PUB. No. 328 (1951).
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terized by the commitment of criminal courts to formalities
designed in part to protect the due process rights of defendants, 42
juvenile courts always have found themselves under attack by liberal
critics whose core concern has been with the constitutionality ofju-
venile court procedures, policies, and broad dispositional powers. 43
Critical and clear language, for example, appears in In re Coyle:
"Juvenile court procedure has not been so far socialized and indi-
vidual rights so far diminished that a child may be taken from its
parents and placed in a state institution simply because some court
might think that to be in the best interests of the state." 44 Indeed,
such sharp attacks on what was to become the guiding philosophy of
juvenile courts were in evidence even before the Illinois legislation
of 1899.4 5
42 B. KRISBERG &J. AUSTIN, supra note 19; A. PLATr, supra note 10; Fox, supra note 10;
Lemert, The Juvenile Court-Quest and Realities, in PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCE-
MENT AND ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME 91 (1967);
Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARv. L. REV. 104 (1909); Mack, The Juvenile Court as a Legal
Institution, in PREVENTIVE TREATMENT OF NEGLECTED CHILDREN 293 (H. Hart ed. 1910).
43 See, e.g., NATIONAL JUVENILE LAw CENTER, INC., LEGISLATIVE RESOURCE MANUAL
FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION ACT
(1979); Fox, supra note 10; Note, Rights and Rehabilitation in the Juvenile Courts, 67 COLUM.
L. REV. 281 (1967). Notwithstanding criticism of the policies and procedures adopted
within the juvenile court system, it is important to recognize that between 1899, when
the initial Illinois juvenile court legislation was enacted, and 1966, when the decision of
the United States Supreme Court in Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, was issued, not
a single directly relevant juvenile delinquency case was formally decided by the Court.
But see Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962) (holding that due process clause pro-
hibits use of improperly obtained confession ofjuvenile tried in criminal court); Haley v.
Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948) (holding that due process clause prohibits use of coerced
confession ofjuvenile tried in criminal court); West Virginia State Board of Education v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (holding invalid state law requiring pledge of allegiance
by public school children).
Thus, the development of our juvenile justice system between no later than 1899
and 1966 is most unusual in two regards. First, the authors are aware of no major inno-
vation in either the criminal or the juvenile justice system that transformed the structure
and function of courts so swiftly as did the rush to follow the general model created in
Illinois. Second, it is almost impossible to imagine that so major an adjustment in the
structure of the judicial system and in the routine application of legal policy persisted
for so long a period of time with no more than a handful of denials of requests for writs
of certiorari. Even a few years before Kent, however, the United States Supreme Court
appears to have supported its continuing "hands off doctrine" by accepting the simple
contention advanced by the Pickett Supreme Court that "[s]ince juvenile courts are not
criminal courts, the constitutional rights granted to persons accused of crimes are not
applicable to the children brought before them." In re Holmes, 379 Pa. 599, 109 A.2d
523 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 973 (1955).
44 In re Coyle, 122 Ind. App. 217, 219, 101 N.E.2d 192, 193 (1951).
45 An early and important example of this is provided by Exparte Crouse, 4 Whart. 9
(Pa. 1838). See also Exparte Sharpe, 16 Idaho 120, 96 P. 563 (1908); People v. Turner,
55 Ill. 280 (1870); Commonwealth v. Fisher, 213 Pa. 48, 62 A. 198 (1905). Increas-
ingly, however, the courts came to push such challenges aside by referring to the parens
patriae power of the State and by declaring that juvenile and criminal courts are qualita-
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These attacks notwithstanding, challenges to the expanding
powers of juvenile courts proved to be futile throughout most of
this century. During the "due process revolution" of the 1960's and
early 1970's, however, the United States Supreme Court, in such cel-
ebrated cases as Kent v. United States,46 In re Gault,4 7 In re Win-
ship,48 and Breed v. Jones,49 determined that the simple status of
being a juvenile could not be equated with a total lack of access to
fundamental constitutional rights. This brief burst of judicial activ-
ism drew mixed reviews from those with special interests in juvenile
law and the role of juvenile courts. Many expressed concerns that
the Court was moving in a direction that would have the effect of
eliminating most if not all distinctions between juvenile and adult
courts and, consequently, that the objective of the juvenile justice
system would become the pursuit of retributive justice within a fully
adversary system.
The "doom and gloom" predictions of those who supported
the retention of what they took to be a traditional juvenile court
system did not prove to be accurate, at least to the extent that those
predictions involved concerns about the probable direction in which
the United States Supreme Court would move. In Winship,50 for ex-
ample, Chief Justice Burger contended that "[wihat the juvenile
court system needs is not more but less of the trappings of legal
procedure and judicial formalism; the juvenile court system requires
breathing room and flexibility in order to survive ... the repeated
assaults from this court." 5 1 Similarly, as the Court rejected the no-
tion that juveniles had a federal constitutional right to a trial by jury
in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,52 Justice Blackmun suggested that "[i]f
the formalities of the criminal adjudicative process are to be super-
imposed upon the juvenile court system, there is little need for its
separate existence. Perhaps that ultimate disillusionment will come
one day, but for the moment we are disinclined to give impetus to
it." 53 Those favoring the retention of a system of juvenile courts-
tively different entities. See, e.g., In re Holmes, 379 Pa. 599, 109 A.2d 523 (1954), cert.
denied, 348 U.S. 973 (1955).
46 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
47 387 U.S. 1 (1967)
48 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
49 421 U.S. 519 (1975) (holding that fifth and fourteenth amendment protections
against double jeopardy apply to subsequent criminal proceedings after adjudicatory
hearings in juvenile courts). But see Swisher v. Brady, 438 U.S. 204 (1978).
50 397 U.S. 358, 376 (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
51 Id. (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
52 403 U.S. 528 (1971) (holding that due process rights of juveniles charged with
unlawful conduct do not include right to trial by jury).
53 Id. at 551.
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even courts that were required to relinquish some portion of their
discretionary powers as a consequence of the Kent-Gault-Winship tril-
ogy-then breathed a sigh of relief.54
54 Proponents of providing a distinctively different set of constitutional rights to
juveniles-which is to say a reduced access to due process protections-appear to have
found some new friends judging from recent and somewhat tortured opinions of the
United States Supreme Court. Several significant examples are obvious. In Schall v.
Martin, 104 S. Ct. 2403 (1984), for instance, the Court overturned a holding of the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 689 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1982), regarding a provi-
sion of the New York Family Court Act, § 320.5(3)(b), that provided for the pre-trial
detention ofjuveniles if it was the opinion of the juvenile court that suchjuveniles would
present a risk to themselves or others were they not detained. The Court of Appeals had
determined that the statute was unconstitutional, largely because (1) "the detention pe-
riod serves as punishment imposed without proof of guilt established according to the
constitutional standard," 689 F.2d at 374, and (2) because "the vast majority ofjuveniles
detained ... either have their petitions dismissed before an adjudication of delinquency
or are released after adjudication," 689 F.2d at 369. The Supreme Court majority, in an
opinion delivered by Justice Rehnquist, ignored altogether the inability to predict dan-
gerousness of either juveniles or adults in a suitably reliable and valid fashion. The
majority reasoned in part that the maximum detention period of seventeen days was not
so great and, in any event, not inconsistent with the parens patriae powers of the State.
The case of Parham v.J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979), provides a still more troublesome
case in point. It involved a class-action suit based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in which volun-
tary commitment procedures ofjuveniles pursuant to GA. CODE §§ 88-503.1, 88-503.2,
had been challenged. While agreeing that juveniles have a protected liberty interest in
such settings, the Court, in an opinion by ChiefJustice Burger, found no need for either
a formal or quasi-formal hearing prior to the commitment of juveniles as a means of
guaranteeing their due process rights. By implication, then, the earlier holdings in such
celebrated cases as Kent, Gault, and Winship may be ignored altogether so long as the
State seeks to commit juveniles to hospitals rather than to training schools.
Consider also Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979). After being taken into cus-
tody by police in Van Nuys, California, sixteen year-old Michael C. responded to stan-
dard Miranda warnings by requesting the presence of his probation officer. The request
was refused and, with no attorney or parent present, the police obtained incriminating
statements. The California Supreme Court subsequently determined that, for Miranda
purposes and in cases involving juveniles, the request of Michael C. was the equivalent
to a request for counsel. In re Michael C., 21 Cal.3d 471, 579 P.2d 7 (1978), rev'd, 442
U.S. 707 (1979). Despite strong dissent from Justices Marshall, Brennan and Stevens,
the Court held that Michael C.'s request for his probation officer was not an invocation
of fifth amendment protections against self-incrimination and that admissions made by
him should not have been suppressed. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979).
As a final and recent illustration of the apparent retrenchment of the Court in the
area of due process rights ofjuveniles, consider New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733
(1985). There the Court granted certiorari to determine the applicability of the exclu-
sionary rule to searches of public school students conducted by school officials. Recog-
nizing that searches and seizures must be reasonable and that public school students
enjoy a protected privacy interest while they are on school property, the Court held that
school officials need not seek a warrant before searching students and, moreover, that
the searches they do conduct need not stem from considerations of probable cause to
believe that any rule or law has been violated by the persons they search. Only a vaguely
defined "reasonableness test" need be met to support such searches and to avoid en-
tirely any fourth amendment entanglements.
These and related cases make it abundantly clear that any who hypothesized some-
thing approaching a complete set of due process rights to juveniles in the wake of such
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It quickly became apparent, however, that this sigh of relief
stemmed from understandings that were as poorly grounded as ear-
lier predictions that the Court was going to strike at the very heart
of the philosophy upon which the juvenile courts had been con-
structed. Specifically, what the Supreme Court now appears to have
been indicating was a growing hesitancy to further dismantle the ju-
venile court system by setting forth judicially promulgated guide-
lines that would blur or eliminate the distinction between juvenile
and criminal courts. Recall, however, that this manifestation ofjudi-
cial restraint appeared at a point in recent history during which the
"crime in the streets" issue was becoming a dominant public and
political concern. One dimension of this concern, widely believed
to have been a reflection of the post-World War II "baby boomers"
reaching the age at which disproportionate involvement in crime
and delinquency always has been common (i.e., roughly those be-
tween the ages of fifteen and twenty-five), included a rapid growth
in the numbers of juveniles who were alleged to have engaged in
serious violations of law.5 5 A related dimension included a rapidly
growing reservation about the rehabilitative potential of either the
juvenile or the criminal justice system.5 6
The legislative response was as quick as it was popular. A "get
tough on crime" plank became an almost obligatory ingredient in
the promises made by politicians at all levels of government. Sup-
port for individualized treatment of offenders and a commitment to
the so-called "rehabilitative ideal" quickly gave way to retribution,
"just deserts," long mandatory sentences for a variety of criminal
offenses, the abolition of parole within the adult system, and, at the
extreme, a major reversal in both public and legislative definitions
of the appropriateness of capital punishment. 57 More significantly,
for our purposes here, jurisdiction after jurisdiction made sweeping
decisions as Gault were unappreciative of how definitions attached to the Bill of Rights
and the fourteenth amendment due process and equal protection clause can change as
swiftly as does the composition of the Court.
55 Evidence of growth in the rate as well as the sheer number ofjuvenile offenses is
abundant. For example, the estimated number of arrests of persons under eighteen
years of age in 1960 was 485,007. By 1975, this rose to 1,184,105, or a percentage
increase of 144.1. During the same time period, arrests of persons eighteen years of age
or older rose from 2,969,209 to 3,353,285, or a far more modest percentage increase of
12.9. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 182 (1976).
56 See supra note 38.
57 Perhaps the most frequently cited reference is E. VAN DEN HAAG, PUNISHING
CRIMINALS: CONCERNING A VERY OLD AND PAINFUL QUESTION (1975). For a less superfi-
cial and politically conservative treatment of many of the same issues, see JUSTICE AS
FAIRNESS: PERSPECTIVES ON THEJUSTICE MODEL (D. Fogel &J. Hudson eds. 1981); SEN-
TENCING (H. Gross & A. von Hirsch eds. 1981).
THOMAS AND BILCHIK
modifications in the provisions of juvenile law.58
In ways that will be considered more thoroughly elsewhere in
this analysis, legislative bodies at both the state and federal levels
moved to redefine previous definitions of (1) the age below which
jurisdiction over those alleged to have violated the provisions of law
would be disposed of by juvenile rather than criminal courts and (2)
the circumstances under which prosecutors rather than juvenile
court judges would have the non-reviewable discretionary power to
determine the court before which juveniles would be required to
appear. An extreme illustration of this major transition is provided
by a now-amended provision of Wyoming law.59 The relevant por-
tion stated, "All complaints alleging misconduct of a minor other
than violation of a municipal ordinance, Wyo. STAT. § 12-6-101 or a
misdemeanor violation of the Uniform Act Regulating Traffic on
Highways, must be referred to the county and prosecuting attorney
who shall determine the appropriate action to be taken and the appropriate
court in which to prosecute the action."'60
To be sure, legislative actions designed to do what the United
States Supreme Court had either refused to do or did not wish to do
have not gone unchallenged. In particular, many have advanced the
view that the expansion of prosecutorial powers to a point at which
prosecutors, without benefit of any judicial hearing and on the au-
thority of little more than broad legislative guidelines, is flatly con-
tradictory to the holding of the Supreme Court in Kent v. United
States.6 1 Repeatedly, however, the appellate courts held that there
is no constitutional defect in those provisions of juvenile law that
58 For a relatively recent review of some related materials, see D. HAMPARIAN, YOUTH
IN ADULT COURTS (1982).
59 For a critical discussion, see Brinkerhoff, Prosecution as a Juvenile or an Adult? Is the
Discretion Vested in the District Attorney by Section 14-6-203(c) of the Wyoming Statutes Unconsti-
tutional and Violative of the Proper Role of a Prosecutor?, 19 LAND & WATER L. REV. 187
(1983).
60 Wyo. STAT. § 14-6-203(c) (1978) (emphasis added) (current version at Wyo. STAT.
§14-6-203(c) (Supp. 1985)).
61 383 U.S. 541 (1966). There are numerous illustrations of this position, but an
especially sound example is provided by CircuitJudge Wright's strong dissent in United
States v. Bland, 472 F.2d 1329, 1338 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 909 (1973).
He hotly opposed statutory adjustments that removed the need for a traditional waiver
hearing prior to any transfer ofjuvenile defendants to the jurisdiction of criminal courts.
See 16 D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2301(3)(A)(Supp. V 1972) (current version at D.C. CODE
ANN. 16-2301(b)(A) (1981)). In particular, Judge Wright complains that the relevant
portion of the amended D.C. CODE "was written into the Act in order to countermand
the Supreme Court's decision in Kent as well as this court's rulings in Watkins [referring
to Watkins v. United States, 343 F.2d 278 (D.C. Cir. 1964)] and Black [referring to Black
v. United States, 355 F.2d 104 (D.C. Cir. 1965)]." Bland, 472 F.2d at 1341 (Wright, J.,
dissenting). He later concludes that "I would therefore hold that Congress may not
abrogate a child's constitutional right to a hearing, representation by counsel and a
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grant prosecutors powers that would be viewed as improper were
they to be exercised by juvenile court judges. 62
This position was made especially clear, for example, in Cox v.
United States.63 The defendant, a juvenile, had been convicted of
armed bank robbery by a United States District Court. Contending
that he had a right to a hearing designed to determine whether the
District Court should have tried him as a juvenile rather than as an
adult, Cox appealed. Delivering the majority opinion for the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals, in which the Court denied that any right to
such a hearing existed, ChiefJudge Haynsworth contrasted the role
of juvenile court judges and prosecutors in the following fashion:
When the question is one of waiver ofjurisdiction of a juvenile court
and it is to be decided by a judge of the juvenile court, it is clear that
the juvenile is entitled to a hearing on the question of waiver and the
assistance of counsel in that hearing.
This is entirely consistent with our tradition that the decisions of
judges in judicial proceedings affecting substantial rights of persons
charged with criminal violations shall be reached only after an oppor-
tunity is afforded for a full and fair hearing with the benefit of counsel.
We have no such tradition with respect to prosecutorial decisions
to seek an indictment, or not to seek one, to make or not to make a
charge, or to charge a greater offense or a lesser one. Such decisions
have a substantial impact on the outcome of subsequent proceedings.
Indeed, they may foreclose such proceedings, but they are left for de-
termination by the prosecutor without a hearing and without exten-
sion of any of the other due process protections to the person whose
exposure and degree of exposure to prosecution the prosecutor
determines. 64
In effect, then, in Cox and other cases, appellate courts seem
inclined to hold that the decision-maker rather than the decision is
what is at issue when it is determined that charges of unlawful con-
duct involving juveniles are to be pursued before criminal rather
than juvenile courts. When the determination is made by a juvenile
court judge within the context of a traditional waiver hearing, then
the guidelines articulated in Kent are likely to be granted constitu-
tional stature.65 If, however, a legislative body has granted discre-
statement of reasons before he is charged and tried as an adult." Id. at 1350 (Wright, J.,
dissenting).
62 See, e.g., Woodard v. Wainwright, 556 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1088 (1978); Russell v. Parratt, 543 F.2d 1214 (8th Cir. 1976); Cox v. United States,
473 F.2d 334 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 869 (1973); United States v. Bland, 472
F.2d 1329 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 909 (1973); Vega v. Bell, 47 N.Y.2d 543,
393 N.E.2d 450, 47 N.Y.S.2d 543 (1979).
63 473 F.2d 334 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 869 (1973).
64 Id. at 335-36.
65 See, e.g., Geboy v. Gray, 471 F.2d 575 (7th Cir. 1973) (holding that juveniles enjoy
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tionary powers regarding such decisions to prosecutors rather than
to members of the judiciary, even when such legislative enactments
contain very few guidelines regarding the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion, then the appellate courts, in deference to a combination
of the separation of powers doctrine and an historical hesitancy to
subject prosecutorial discretion to more than minimal constitutional
constraints, seem likely to concur with the Cox court view that select-
ing a criminal court rather than a juvenile court "is a prosecutorial
decision beyond the reach of the due process rights of counsel and a
hearing." 66
The question, quite obviously, is whether the substantial
changes we are witnessing presently in our bodies of juvenile law
mark the demise of the entire juvenile justice system and a conse-
quent elevation in the harshness of the dispositions that will be ac-
corded juveniles who find themselves confronted with the risk of
adult instead of juvenile dispositions. The initial answer might ap-
pear to be clear. Nicholas Kittrie, for example, has predicted, "The
juvenile court in the United States is in a state of decline. If current
trends continue, the separate system of justice for children which
now exists may come to an end in the 1980's."167
Should this and similar predictions prove to be correct, the
growing legislative commitment to retribution as the primary goal
of sentencing in adult courts, as is reflected by the State of Florida's
straight-forward observations that "[t]he primary purpose of sen-
tencing is to punish the offender" and that "[r]ehabilitation and
other traditional considerations continue to be desired goals of the
both timely appointment of counsel prior to and right to effective assistance of counsel
during transfer hearings); Kemplen v. Maryland, 428 F.2d 169 (4th Cir. 1970) (holding
that juvenile defendants have right to counsel during hearings in juvenile court regard-
ing motions to transfer jurisdiction to criminal courts).
66 Cox, 473 F.2d at 335. This, of course, reflects the far broader willingness of the
appellate courts to defer, for example, to the separation of powers doctrine as a means
of avoiding judicial review of the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. To be sure, the
United States Supreme Court consistently has held that abuses of prosecutorial discre-
tion are reviewable given fourteenth amendment protections. In Bordenkircher v.
Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978), for example, Justice Stewart observed, "There is no doubt
that the breadth of discretion that our country's legal system vests in prosecuting attor-
neys carries with it the potential for both individual and institutional abuse. And broad
though that discretion may be, there are undoubtedly constitutional limits upon its ex-
cercise." Id. at 365. There are even celebrated cases that illustrate the reviewability of
prosecutorial charging decisions. See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
Judicial restraint in this area, however, is well-established. See, e.g., Rose v. Mitchell, 443
U.S. 545 (1979); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975); Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S.
541 (1962).
67 N. KITrRIE, THE RIGHT To BE DIFFERENT 107 (1971).
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criminal justice system but must assume a subordinate role,"' 6 8
could indeed result in harsh, punitive responses to juvenile
offenders.
It is equally obvious, however, that how emerging trends in ju-
venile law will impact on the fate of juveniles has yet to be estab-
lished. To begin with, it would be foolish to attack recent
modifications in law and in practice as being destructive of a system
whose merit was appreciated by all concerned. Recall, for example,
that real defects in previous juvenile law and procedure prompted
Justice Fortas to conclude, "While there can be no doubt of the
original laudable purpose of juvenile courts . .. [t]here is evidence
* . .that the child receives the worst of both worlds: that he gets
neither the protections accorded to adults nor the solicitous care
and regenerative treatment postulated for children." 69 Similarly, in
delivering the majority opinion of the Court in Gault,70 Justice For-
tas observed that
Juvenile Court history has again demonstrated that unbridled discre-
tion, however benevolently motivated, is frequently a poor substitute
for principle and procedure. In 1937, Dean Pound wrote: "The pow-
ers of the Star Chamber were a trifle in comparison with those of our
juvenile courts." [citation omitted]. The absence of substantive stan-
dards has not necessarily meant that children receive careful, compas-
sionate, individualized treatment. 71
Thus, there are ample reasons for advocates of a traditional juvenile
court system to refrain from thinking of earlier periods of history as
"the good old days."
Furthermore, many of the changes that we are witnessing today
are a good deal more complex than some have depicted them to be.
Although it is true that many statutory adjustments have eroded the
discretionary and the jurisdictional powers of juvenile courts, they
have not necessarily done so in a manner that automatically deprives
all juveniles who appear before criminal courts of many of the bene-
fits they are said to have enjoyed previously. Thus, what appears to
be essential is that we develop a fuller appreciation for the specific
nature of recent adjustments in the provisions and purposes ofjuve-
nile law and that we be especially attentive to the manner in which
that body of law is applied in the everyday life of our judicial system.
Fostering such an awareness will be the primary objective of the
remaining portions of this analysis. Specifically, in the following
68 The Florida Bar: Amendment to Rules of Criminal Procedure (3.701, 3.988-Sen-
tencing Guidelines), 451 So. 2d 824, 825 (Fla. 1984) (per curiam).
69 Kent, 383 U.S. at 555-56.
70 387 U.S. at 18.
71 Id.
460 THOMAS AND BILCHIK [Vol. 76
section, we will examine relevant provisions of Florida law, espe-
cially those provisions of law which deal with criminal versus juve-
nile court jurisdiction over juveniles who are alleged to have
engaged in unlawful conduct (as opposed to cases involving depen-
dency and neglect issues). 72 Because many of the present provi-
sions of Florida law have much in common with the post-Kent
statutes of many non-Florida jurisdictions, 73 this portion of our
analysis should be of general interest. Attention will then turn to a
presentation of empirical data regarding the manner in which these
features of Florida law are being translated into legal practice in one
major metropolitan jurisdiction (Dade County, Florida-the county
within which Miami is located).
IV. CONTEMPORARY PROVISIONS OF FLORIDA LAW
Juvenile law in the State of Florida has changed substantially
during the past decade. As has been true in many other jurisdic-
tions in the United States, these changes have tended to increase the
discretionary powers of prosecutors while decreasing the jurisdic-
tional powers of the juvenile court as the age of children alleged to
have engaged in unlawful conduct moves them closer to adulthood.
Thus, after noting one somewhat unusual feature of Florida law that
stems from the Florida Constitution, we will divide our overview of
relevant provisions of Florida's juvenile law into three segments:
(1) treatment of children below the age of fourteen, (2) treatment of
children who are fourteen or fifteen, and (3) treatment of children
who are sixteen or seventeen.74
72 Florida law attempts to draw a clear distinction between two categories of
juveniles over whom its juvenile courts are given jurisdiction. Of particular importance
is the fact that Florida law defines as dependent rather than as delinquent those
juveniles who run away from home, who are habitually truant, or who are believed to be
beyond control of their parents. See FLA. STAT. ANN. [hereinafter referred to as FSA]
§§39.01(8)-(9)(West Supp. 1985). This non-delinquent categorization of so-called "sta-
tus offenders" reflects a national trend that was stimulated by a federal initiative, the
JuvenileJustice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974. See supra note 3. Interestingly,
however, theJJDP Act does not define the term "status offender." Instead, the Office of
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention defined "status offender" by regulation as
follows: "A juvenile offender who has been charged with or adjudicated for conduct
which would not, under the law of the jurisdiction in which the offense was committed,
be a crime if committed by an adult." 28 C.F.R. §31.304 (h)(1985).
73 See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. §45-420 (1975 & Supp. 1984); IND. CODE ANN. §31-6-2-
4(e) (Burns 1984); NEB. REv. STAT. §43-276 (1981); UTAH CODE ANN. §78-3a-25 (1978).
74 A juvenile, for the purposes of Florida law, is "any married or unmarried person
who is charged with a violation of law occuring pior to the time that person reached the age of 18
),ears." FSA §39.01(7) (West Supp. 1985) (emphasis added). However, once there has
been a finding of delinquency, juveniles may be subject to the jurisdiction of the court
until they reach the age of 19. See FSA §§39.11(2)(c), 39.11 1(4)(b) (West Supp. 1985).
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A. THE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE OF FULL DUE PROCESS RIGHTS
Advocates of granting full due process rights to juveniles have
never been entirely successful when they have argued their position
before the United States Supreme Court. Although such landmark
decisions as Kent, Gault, and Winship illustrate significant movement
in that direction, the decisions of the Court in McKeiver and else-
where made it clear that there were limits to the willingness of the
Court to accord full due process rights to juveniles.
It is obvious, of course, that the United States Supreme Court
intended to specify only those rights that the individual states could
not abridge. There has never been any intention on the part of the
Court to inhibit individual jurisdictions from expanding the rights
of either juveniles or adults. Such an expansion is provided for in
Florida's Constitution. The relevant portion of that document con-
tains the following language:
When authorized by law, a child as therein defined may be charged
with a violation of law as an act of delinquency instead of crime and
tried without ajury or other requirements applicable to criminal cases.
Any child so charged shall, upon demand as provided by law before a
trial in a juvenile proceeding, be tried in an appropriate court as an
adult.75
Statutory reflections of this constitutional provision clearly indi-
cate that a child of any age may assert his or her right to a trial by
jury in a criminal rather than a juvenile court:
The court shall transfer and certify the case for trial as if the child were
an adult if the child is alleged to have committed a violation of law
and, prior to the commencement of an adjudicatory hearing, the child,
joined by a parent or, in the absence of a parent, by his guardian or
guardian ad litem, demands in writing to be tried as an adult.7 6
The obvious effect of these constitutional and statutory provi-
sions is that any juvenile charged with unlawful conduct has initial
control over the forum in which his or her case will be heard. Our
greater concern here, however, is with the relative powers of the
This dispositional power does not attach to cases resulting in findings of dependency.
In those cases, supervision may not persist beyond a child's eighteenth birthday. FSA
§ 39.41(l)(a) (West Supp. 1985).
75 FLA. STAT. ANN. CONST. art. I, § 15(b) (West 1970).
76 FSA §39.02(5)(b) (West Supp. 1985). In addition, the relevant portion of Florida's
procedural law, Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure [hereinafter cited as FLA. R. Juv.
P.], Rule 8.150(a), reads as follows:
On demand for waiver of jurisdiction, the court shall enter a written order setting
forth the demand, waivingjurisdiction, and certifying the case for trial as if the child
were an adult. The demand shall be made, as required by law, in writing or orally,
prior to the commencement of an adjudicatory hearing.
FLA. R.Juv. P. 8.150(a).
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juvenile court and of prosecutors. It is to that concern that we now
shift our attention.
B. OFFENDERS BELOW THE AGE OF FOURTEEN
Florida has not explicitly adopted common law standards re-
garding the age at which juvenile offenders have the capacity in-
tentfully to violate the law-indeed, it would be possible for a child
of any age to be required to appear before ajuvenile court based on
allegations of unlawful conduct. Juvenile courts have exclusive ju-
risdiction over virtually all cases involving children below the age of
fourteen. Only two significant exceptions to this general rule war-
rant comment. First, of course, children below the age of fourteen
can assert their constitutional right to a trial by jury in an adult
court. Second, Florida law requires that:
[a] child of any age charged with a violation of Florida law punishable
by death or by life imprisonment shall be subject to the jurisdiction of
the [juvenile] court.., unless and until an indictment on such charge
is returned, by the grand jury. When an indictment is returned the
petition for delinquency, if any, shall be dismissed. The child shall be
tried and handled in every respect as if he were an adult .... 77
Because this provision does not require that the prosecutor
seek a grand jury indictment in such cases involving juveniles below
the age of fourteen, and also because other provisions of Florida law
prohibit prosecutors from seeking a traditional waiver hearing in the
juvenile court in cases involving those below the age of fourteen,78
the likelihood that young children will be required to appear before
a criminal court is exceedingly small.
C. OFFENDERS BETWEEN THE AGES OF FOURTEEN AND SIXTEEN
As the ages of juvenile defendants increase, Florida law ex-
pands the discretionary powers of prosecutors while simultaneously
diminishing those of the juvenile court. This shift begins to become
apparent in cases involving juveniles who are fourteen or fifteen
years of age. In addition to the fact that such juveniles can assert
their right to a trial by jury in an adult court and the fact that prose-
cutors may seek a grand jury indictment in cases involving offenses
punishable by death or life imprisonment, additional transfer mech-
anisms materialize. First, prosecutors have the discretionary power
77 FSA §39.02(5)(c)(1).
78 FSA §39.02(2)(a) contains the following relevant language: "[T]he state attorney
may file a motion requesting the court to transfer the child for criminal prosecution if
the child was 14 or more years of age at the alleged time of commission of the violation
of law for which he is charged." See also FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.150(b).
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to request that a waiver hearing be held within the juvenile court.
Consistent with the standards articulated by the United States
Supreme Court in Kent, any decision on the part of the juvenile
court to waive its jurisdiction must be documented in writing and
must reflect a consideration of numerous criteria set forth in Florida
law.79 Second, if any child was fourteen years of age or older at the
time of the alleged violation of law and he or she
"has been previously adjudicated delinquent for a violent crime
against a person, to wit: murder, sexual battery, armed or strong-
armed robbery, aggravated battery, or aggravated assault, and is cur-
rently charged with a second or subsequent such offense, the state at-
torney shall file a motion requesting the court to transfer the child for
criminal prosecution .... 80
In effect, then, juvenile courts in Florida have been granted ex-
clusive jurisdiction over juveniles who are below the age of sixteen,
and this jurisdiction may not be challenged unless the challenge is
made (1) by the juvenile, (2) via a prosecutorial decision to seek a
grand jury indictment in a narrowly defined set of cases, or (3) as a
consequence of a well-supported motion for a waiver ofjurisdiction
that may and sometimes must be filed by a prosecutor. While such
standards modestly increase the probability that juveniles will ap-
pear before criminal courts, the probability is not great. Moreover,
the burden that must be assumed by the prosecution is high. Stated
somewhat differently, the erosion of the traditional powers of the
juvenile court is not substantial prior to the time attention focuses
on those who are sixteen or seventeen years of age.
D. OFFENDERS BETWEEN THE AGES OF SIXTEEN AND EIGHTEEN
It is quite easy to argue that Florida law, for most practical pur-
poses, has so structured the provisions of its juvenile law that those
who reach the age of sixteen have become adults in spite of statu-
tory language that defines eighteen as the beginning of adulthood.
Naturally, a transfer of jurisdiction over this category of juveniles
may be accomplished by any of the means we have identified previ-
ously (i.e., "demand motions" made by the juvenile, grand jury in-
dictments for some types of offenses, and waiver hearings held
within the juvenile court). In addition, however, there is one narrow
79 FSA §39.02(2)(c)(1-8). This set of criteria directs the attention of the court to the
seriousness of the alleged offense, the prosecutive merit of the case, the sophistication
and maturity of the child, the prior offense record of the child, any indications of respon-
siveness to prior rehabilitative efforts, and the ability of the dispositional alternatives
available to the juvenile court effectively to protect the public.
80 FSA §39.09(2)(a) (emphasis added).
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and one very broad means of accomplishing a transfer. Both stem
from the filing of a bill of information.
Regarding the narrow area of interest, the provision of Florida
law referred to previously that requires the filing of a motion for
waiver of jurisdiction in cases involving those fourteen or fifteen
year-olds who are charged with serious crimes and who have previ-
ously been adjudicated delinquent on similar charges, also requires
the filing of a bill of information if the child is sixteen or seven-
teen.8' When an information is filed, there is no hearing within the
juvenile or any other court with regard to the selection of an appro-
priate court. More importantly, however, another provision of Flor-
ida law provides a very broad means of accomplishing transfer and
reads as follows: "With respect to any child who at the time of the
commission of the alleged offense was 16 or 17 years of age, [the
state attorney may] file an information when in his judgment and
discretion the public interest requires that adult sanctions be con-
sidered or imposed." 82
This broad discretionary power can be and is exercised without
any hearing on the merits of the rationale relied upon by the prose-
cutor. Regarding those charged with felony offenses, there is no
challenge whatsoever to this aspect of prosecutorial discretion. If,
however, a bill of information is filed when the charged offense is
classified as a misdemeanor or, presumably at least, "a violation of a
local penal ordinance,"83 then "[u]pon motion of a child ... the
case shall be transferred for adjudicatory proceedings as a child ...
if it is shown by the child that he had not previously been found to
have committed two delinquent acts, one of which involved an of-
fense classified under Florida law as a felony." 84
E. THE IMPACT OF ALTERATIONS OF FLORIDA JUVENILE LAW
This information shows that prosecutors in Florida now enjoy
considerable discretionary powers, powers that were once vested in
juvenile courts both in Florida and many if not all other jurisdic-
tions. This is most obviously the case with regard to juveniles who
are sixteen years of age or older. Given the historical mandate re-
quiring that prosecutors emphasize retributive punishment rather
than rehabilitation, it could thus appear that the "get tough on
crime" movement in Florida has been quite successful.
81 Id.
82 FSA §39.04(2)(e)(4) (West Supp. 1985).
83 FSA §39.01(33).
84 FSA §39.04(2)(e)(4). See also Note, Prosecutorial Waiver ofJuveniles into Adult Criminal
Court: The Ends ofJustice ... Or the End ofJustice? State v. Cain, 5 NovA L.J. 487 (1981).
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Before moving forward, it is critically important to emphasize
how deceptive appearances can be. More specifically, additional
provisions of Florida's juvenile law have created what many would
consider to be an ironic distribution of dispositional powers. While
the tradition of a separate system ofjuvenile courts places much em-
phasis on the alleged ability ofjuvenile courts to exercise more flexi-
ble dispositional powers than one finds in adult courts, the reverse
is now true in Florida. With the single exception of juveniles in-
dicted for crimes punishable by death or life imprisonment who are
subsequently convicted of such offenses,85 the criminal court can
pursue any one of three basic options. The first of these permits the
court to select from all of the dispositions that could have been re-
lied upon had the case been disposed of by a juvenile court.86 In-
deed, "suitability or nonsuitability for adult sanctions shall be
determined by the court before any other determination or disposi-
tion."'8 7 This determination requires the consideration of standards
similar to those set forth in Kent.88 Second, the criminal court may
select an intermediate strategy by invoking the Florida Youthful Of-
fender Act,8 9 the stated purpose of which "is to improve the chances
of correction and successful return to the community of youthful
offenders sentenced to imprisonment by preventing their associa-
tion with older and more experienced criminals during the terms of
their confinement. '" 90 Indeed, other provisions of the Youthful Of-
fender Act make it possible for the criminal court to sentence ajuve-
nile, for Florida's Department of Corrections to determine that the
child is better suited for commitment to juvenile programs operated
by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, for the
child to then be administratively transferred into such a program,
and even for the child to later be re-transferred to the control of the
Department of Corrections. 9' Finally, the criminal court can exer-
cise its traditional power by sentencing under the provisions of
criminal law.92
Florida, in short, has created an unusual and complex set of
legal provisions in its body of juvenile law. While effectively pre-
85 FSA §39.02(5)(c)(3) requires that "[i]f the child is found to have committed the
offense punishable by death or by life imprisonment, the child shall be sentenced as an
adult." FSA § 39.02(5)(c)(3)(West Supp. 1985) (emphasis added).
86 See FSA §39.111, especially 39.111(6).
87 FSA §39.111(6)(c).
88 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
89 FSA §958.04(1)(a) (West 1985).
90 FSA §958.021 (West 1985).
91 FSA §959.116(1) (West 1985).
92 FSA §39.111(6)(c).
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cluding a transfer of jurisdiction of cases involving children below
the age of fourteen, and while also subjecting most efforts to trans-
fer jurisdiction involving children who are fourteen or fifteen to ju-
dicial scrutiny within the juvenile court, it has greatly expanded the
discretionary powers of prosecutors who confront juveniles who are
sixteen or older. In addition, in the vast majority of all cases involv-
ing juveniles who appear before criminal courts, Florida law has
evolved in such a way as to grant its criminal court judges considera-
bly broader dispositional powers than any juvenile court judge has
ever enjoyed. This paradoxical redistribution of power virtually de-
fies explanation, but the reality of the situation is quite obvious.
V. THE APPLICATION OF JUVENILE LAW IN FLORIDA COURTS
By and large, of course, statutory law and rules of procedure
create possibilities rather than realities in the everyday life of our
legal system. Provisions of law have little meaning unless and until
one fully understands and appreciates how that body of law shapes
the processing of actual cases as they move-or fail to move-
through our juvenile and criminal justice systems.
The need for such quantitative information is great, for the
number of cases coming to the attention of responsible officials in
Florida is enormous. In one recent three-year period, for example,
221,028 separate cases involving allegations of delinquency came to
the attention of Florida's juvenile court intake officials. 93 The vast
majority of these cases remained within the jurisdiction of juvenile
courts (97.43 percent of the 221,028 delinquency cases coming to
the attention of intake officials from 1979 through 1981 did so). 94
However, if one considers raw numbers rather than percentages, it
is also true that significant numbers of juveniles in Florida are now
finding that their cases are being disposed of in the criminal rather
than the juvenile justice system as a consequence of waiver hearings
held within juvenile courts (2,056 waivers of jurisdiction were
granted by juvenile courts during 1979-1981) or because prosecu-
93 Our figures are derived from data collected by the Florida Department of Health
and Rehabilitative Services (DHRS). These data provide the basis for the DHRS Client
Information System, which is a computerized data base maintained by DHRS on all de-
linquency, dependency, and neglect cases that come to the attention of those responsi-
ble for Florida's juvenile justice system. The total of 221,028 delinquency cases has the
following yearly subtotals: 1979, 69,917 cases; 1980, 86,858 cases; and 1981, 64,253
cases.
94 Waivers ofjurisdiction granted by juvenile courts in Florida for the three-year pe-
riod were as follows: 1979, 581 cases; 1980, 782 cases; and 1981, 693 cases. Similar
figures for "direct file" cases for these years were: 1979, 658 cases; 1980, 1,259 cases;
and 1981, 1,614 cases.
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tors have exercised their right to file bills of information (3,631 such
discretionary decisions were made during 1979-1981).95
Most unfortunately, no systematic empirical assessment of the
application of Florida's juvenile law exists at the present time.
Those favoring, as well as those opposing, recent adjustments inju-
venile law are thus left in a position that permits them to do no
more than speculate or make unacceptably crude projections from
limited personal experience and/or equally limited sets of statistical
estimates. Perhaps the most significant contribution of this Article,
therefore, is to be found in the empirical analysis of the characteris-
tics of all cases that came to the attention of those in the Felony
Division of the Dade County State Attorney's Office in 1981.96 In-
deed, it is especially appropriate that the focus of attention be on
this single jurisdiction. Prosecutors in Dade County have been
more willing to pursue juvenile cases before criminal courts than
have those in any other jurisdiction in Florida. In 1981, for exam-
ple, the statewide overview data we were able to obtain from the
Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services indicates
that jurisdiction over a total of 693 juvenile cases was transferred to
criminal courts after waiver hearings held in juvenile courts and that
1,614 cases involved transfers of jurisdiction based on the "direct
file" initiatives of prosecutors. Our data, derived from all case files
involving juvenile defendants processed by Felony Division prose-
cutors in Dade County, show that jurisdiction over 844 Dade
County juveniles moved away from the juvenile court (253 involving
waiver hearing cases, 549 involving "direct file" cases, 33 caused by
grand jury indictments, and 13 cases where this data element was
95 It is significant to note that adjustments in Florida law during the early 1980's sub-
stantially elevated the total number of cases moved into the criminal courts via "direct
files" and that this set of adjustments did not materially influence that number of cases
involving judicial waivers ofjurisdiction granted by the juvenile courts. It is also signifi-
cant to recognize that modifications made in the provisions of Florida's juvenile law
reflect something of a compromise between prosecutorial and legislative preferences.
Specifically, the statutory adjustments that went into effect on July 1, 1981 reflect an
unwillingness of the legislature to reduce the age of presumptive juvenile court jurisdic-
tion from eighteen to sixteen, but a legislative willingness to grant prosecutors broad
discretionary powers over cases involving juveniles who had reached the age of sixteen
or seventeen.
96 All data reported in our analysis were coded by the staff of the Dade County State
Attorney's Office. These materials then were prepared for computerized processing by
the senior author and other staff members of the University of Florida's Center for Stud-
ies in Criminology and Law. It should be noted that our focus is on cases filed rather
than on individuals throughout this analysis. Because a case file was prepared by Dade
County prosecutors on each case that came to their attention, and because the same
defendant may have come to their attention more than a single time during 1981, the
total number ofjuvenile defendants is less than the total number of cases.
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missing in the records reviewed) during 1981. Thus, this single
metropolitan jurisdiction accounted for 36.51 percent of all of the
"waiver" cases and 34.01 percent of all of the "direct file" cases
processed in the entire State during 1981.
Our analysis of the Dade County data will be divided into two
parts. The first part will review briefly the manner in which
prosecutorial discretion over juvenile cases is structured in Dade
County. Having thus described this quite important feature of case
processing, the second part will move to a review of the empirical
data.
A. STRUCTURING THE EXCERCISE OF PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION
A well-established fact of life within our justice system is that
virtually all state and federal statutes grant substantial discretionary
powers to prosecutors. Especially in large metropolitan jurisdic-
tiong, the goals of efficiency and effectiveness as well as a desire to
protect fully the due process rights of defendants commonly man-
dates that broad discretionary powers flowing from statutory provi-
sions be excercised within a context established by administratively
promulgated guidelines. Such mechanisms for structuring the exer-
cise of prosecutorial discretion are in place in Dade County and may
be found in the Dade County State Attorney's Juvenile Division Pol-
icy Manual. 97 The relevant portions of the manual are those regard-
ing the filing of a motion for waiver, the filing of a bill of
information, and the presentation of cases to a grand jury.98
The standard guidelines dealing with a motion for waiver may
be summarized concisely. The guidelines indicate that such a mo-
tion should be filed if (1) the alleged offender was fourteen or fif-
teen years of age, had at least one prior adjudication for a serious
felony offense, and a present charge involving a serious felony of-
fense or (2) the alleged offender was fourteen or fifteen years of age,
had no prior offense record, and was charged with a serious felony
involving conduct that was clearly and intentionally contemptuous
of the life of another.99
The guidelines also require attentiveness to a set of aggravating
and mitigating factors. These factors include prior responsiveness
to treatment efforts within the juvenile system, the extent to which
the juvenile might have acted under strong and immediate provoca-
tion, the length of time that had elapsed between any prior offense
97 Dade County State Attorney's Juvenile Division Policy Manual (1984).
98 Id. at §§ IV & V.
99 Id.
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and the present charge, the intent to inflict or actual infliction of
serious injury to a victim, and the value of property taken or de-
stroyed.'0 0 A balancing of such mitigating and aggravating factors
as well as an application of the guidelines regarding age, offense
record, and seriousness of the presenting offense, therefore, shape
prosecutorial determinations regarding motions for waiver in Dade
County.
Decisions to file bills of information are subjected to similar ad-
ministrative guidelines. The Juvenile Division Policy Manual, as of
August 28, 1980, required that consideration be given to four basic
factors: (1) age, (2) current offense, (3) prior record, and (4) prior
treatment efforts within the juvenile system. 101 With the statutory
amendments that became effective on July 1, 1981-amendments
that expanded the scope of prosecutorial discretion in juvenile
cases-these guidelines were refined considerably. Specifically, the
guidelines call for prosecutors to file a bill of information on all six-
teen or seventeen year-old defendants when (1) the juveniles were
first offenders who were charged with serious felonies (i.e., a life
felony, a first degree felony, a second degree felony against persons,
a burglary of an occupied dwelling, other types of burglary if a given
juvenile had been arrested for a series of burglaries committed
within a brief period of time, or more than one felonious crime of
violence arising out of separate transactions) or (2) thejuveniles had
prior felony adjudications and were charged with any felony (unless
a significant period of time had elapsed between such prior adjudi-
cations and the present charges and the present charges were not
particularly serious). 10 2 Finally, the guidelines call for the grand
jury process to be invoked only with regard to especially serious
offenses and, of course, when permitted by the statutory provisions
we have discussed previously.
On balance, then, substantial efforts have been made in Dade
County to create administrative policies that, while preserving the
discretionary powers that prosecutors have been granted in Florida
as well as in all other jurisdictions, meaningfully structure the ex-
cercise of prosecutorial discretion. Such administrative guidelines
increase the likelihood that particular types of serious offenders will
fall within the jurisdiction of criminal rather than juvenile courts,





diction in the broad spectrum of cases that Florida law defines as
being eligible for such treatment.
B. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF CASE FLOW DATA
The analysis can now shift to a consideration of actual case file
data. The primary purpose will be to address the most frequently
expressed concerns of those who feel that recent modifications in
Florida's juvenile law are having one of two possible negative ef-
fects. First, the authors' conversations with many juvenile justice
system officials in Florida indicate that these officials believe that
unacceptably large numbers ofjuvenile cases that are transferred to
adult criminal court jurisdiction quickly "fall through the cracks" of
that system. One common and understandable belief, for example,
is that cases viewed as being especially problematic within the Juve-
nile Division of the Dade County State Attorney's Office are evalu-
ated very differently by Felony Division prosecutors who routinely
deal with substantial numbers of quite serious felony offenses in-
volving adult offenders. Consequently, it is suggested that the Fel-
ony Division prosecutors are too inclined to not pursue large
numbers of juvenile cases that come to their attention, and there-
fore, that juveniles who are seriously in need of some type of care or
supervision end up receiving neither. This concern also has been
advanced by others who have scholarly interests in this area ofjuve-
nile law. 103
The second and quite contrary hypothesis is that processing
juveniles in criminal rather than juvenile courts subjects them to ex-
ceedingly harsh adult sanctions. This hypothesis is straight-forward
and easily understood. When ajuvenile is brought before a criminal
court, that court has an opportunity to impose the full weight of
criminal sanctions on him or her. Recall, however, that relevant
provisions of Florida law' 04 make the full range of juvenile court
dispositions available to criminal court judges in all but a tiny frac-
tion of cases. Moreover, this Article also has shown that the use of
age either as a mitigating factor or as a complete defense has a
lengthy history in our system of criminal jurisprudence. 0 5
Given this Article's earlier review of both Florida's juvenile law
103 See, e.g., Boland, Fighting Crime: The Problem of Adolescents, 71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMI-
NOLOGY 94 (1980); Boland & Wilson, Age, Crime, and Punishment, 51 PUB. INTEREST 22
(1978); Feld, Delinquent Careers and Criminal Policy, 21 CRIMINOLOGY 195 (1983); Keiter,
Criminal or Delinquent: A Study of Juveniles Transferred to the Criminal Court, 19 CRIME &
DELINQ. 528 (1973).
104 See FSA §39.111.
105 See supra note 11.
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and the administrative guidelines developed in Dade County to
structure the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, there is reason to
doubt the validity of both of these hypotheses. Although Florida
law certainly permits large numbers of juveniles to be brought
before a criminal court-particularly those who are sixteen or seven-
teen at the time of the commission of alleged offenses-the same
body of law grants broad dispositional powers to criminal courts
when and if the time comes to impose sentences onjuveniles. Thus,
the "harshness hypothesis" has no obvious support in Florida law.
Similarly, because of the care that has been taken in the crea-
tion of administrative guidelines for prosecutors in the Dade County
State Attorney's Office Juvenile Division, there is ample reason to
believe that case attrition in the set of cases involving juvenile de-
fendants that is handled by Felony Division prosecutors should not
be high. Nevertheless, the above described hypotheses must be
evaluated empirically.
To begin such an empirical analysis, it should be noted that a
total of 844 cases involving juvenile defendants were processed by
Felony Division prosecutors in Dade County during 1981. Of these
844 cases, 65.1 percent (N=549) involved "direct files," 30.0 per-
cent (N=253) involved waivers of jurisdiction granted by juvenile
courts, 3.4 percent (N=29) involved grand jury indictments, and
data were not available regarding the transfer method employed for
the remaining 1.5 percent (N= 13) of the cases. The characteristics
of this pool of cases warrants some attention before we trace their
movement through the criminal justice process.
A clear majority were sixteen or seventeen years of age at the
time of the alleged offenses. In addition, virtually all (96.8 percent,
N=816) were male, most were non-white (67.8 percent, N=567),
and a majority had some record of prior offenses (while 40.6 per-
cent, N=340, had no prior record; 18.9 percent, N= 158, had one
prior offense; 16.0 percent, N= 134, had two prior offenses; and
24.6 percent, N=206, had three or more prior offenses). 0 6 Fur-
thermore, although a very large number of specific charges were
brought against those in the sample, our data show that the typical
offender was alleged to have engaged in a felony offense against
property (especially burglary or attempted burglary), against person
(especially aggravated assault), or against person and/or property
depending upon the definition one adopts (e.g., attempted robbery,
106 Data were missing with regard to the facts (one case), race (eight cases), and prior
record (seven cases) of some files. Percentages are based on those cases for which com-
plete data were available.
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robbery, and armed robbery). This set of characteristics is consis-
tent with the authors' expectations (though note that only a very
small fraction of these cases-a total of eighteen cases-involved al-
leged violations of drug laws as the most serious alleged offense).
Moreover, the relative seriousness of this set of offenders is further
emphasized by the fact that most (58.8 percent, N=496) had been
charged with two or more presenting offenses.' 0 7
Greater interest attaches to the movement of these cases
through the criminal justice system subsequent to their having en-
tered that system via the filing of a bill of information, a motion for
waiver, or a grand jury indictment. The first step in this process in
Dade County involved a prosecutorial determination either to move
forward with the case or to terminate processing. Standard and
well-understood factors shape this aspect of discretionary decision-
making (e.g., the availability of physical evidence, witnesses, etc.).
Our data show that formal charges were filed by Felony Division
prosecutors in 84.5 percent (N=713) of the 844 cases and that no
further action was taken in the remaining 131 cases (or 15.5 percent
of the total pool of available cases).' 0 8
This low level of case attrition undermines the hypothesis that
large numbers ofjuvenile cases receive no attention by Felony Divi-
sion prosecutors. However, the possibility certainly exists for those
prosecutors to remove cases after an initial decision to charge. As is
true in other jurisdictions, the Dade County prosecutors retain the
option to nolle prosequi. Notwithstanding options, our data once
again reveal relatively little pre-trial case attrition. Of the 713 cases
that prosecutors decided to pursue, 86.5 percent (N=617)
culminated either in a trial or the entry of a plea of guilty. Of the
remaining ninety-six cases, a nolle prosequi decision terminated the
processing of seventy-five. The remaining twenty-one cases either
had not been heard when our data were collected or involved de-
fendants for whom warrants had been issued but who had not been
apprehended. In any event, the data show that 73.1 percent
(N-617) of the initial set of cases (N=844) moved at least as far as
a trial or plea entry.
Especially given the seriousness of the offenses charged against
107 Data on this variable were missing in 31 of the 844 cases.
108 It should be noted that case attrition created by initial prosecutorial screening
within the Felony Division was not evenly distributed across all referral type categories.
Specifically, of the 29 grand jury indictments, 100 percent were retained for further ac-
tion. Similarly, the "retention percentage" for cases coming to the Felony Division after
a successful motion for waiver was 97.6 (N=247). However, for direct files cases this
percentage dropped to 78.0 percent (N=428).
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those in the sample, the clear expectation was that those who move
to a trial or plea entry stage of processing were very unlikely to find
their cases moving out of the system for any reason. The data lend
clear support to such an expectation. In 90.4 percent of the cases
moving to this point of processing (N=617), there was a finding of
guilt. There were several reasons for alternative outcomes. In
forty-one cases (6.7 percent of the total), charges were dismissed by
the criminal court. In fifteen cases (2.4 percent of the total), the
defendant was found not guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity.
In three cases (0.5 percent of the total), information on court dispo-
sition of cases in the sample was missing from our data. We find no
strong predictor in our data of case outcomes not involving a find-
ing of guilt, but the total number of such case outcomes is really too
small to permit any sophisticated statistical analysis on this issue.
Having established that the number of cases that come to the
attention of Felony Division prosecutors which fail to reach a trial
stage is not unusually high and that the vast majority of cases reach-
ing that stage culminate either in a conviction or the entry of a guilty
plea, attention must now be given to ultimate case dispositions.
Both of the critical hypotheses reviewed earlier warrant considera-
tion at this stage of processing. It is possible that sentences im-
posed on juvenile defendants by criminal courts are either (1)
excessive, thereby supporting the position of those who feel that
criminal courts are inclined to deal harshly with juveniles as they
pursue the goal of retribution, or (2) lenient, thereby supporting the
contrary view that juvenile defendants appearing before criminal
courts will receive neither the treatment nor the supervision they
require.
Keeping in mind the fact that those in our sample who were
sentenced by criminal courts most commonly had been found guilty
of serious felony offenses (e.g., 55.1 percent of felonious crimes
against property, primarily burglary; 17.0 percent of attempted or
actual robbery, strong-armed robbery, or armed robbery; and 9.5
percent of felonious crimes against persons), the sentencing infor-
mation captured in our data support neither of these hypotheses. ' 09
For example, looking solely at the sentence imposed for the most
serious offense charged, a clear majority of these juvenile defend-
ants confronted some period of incarceration (66.5 percent of the
558 who were found to be guilty were sentenced to a term of impris-
onment; the median length of sentence for those who were incarcer-
109 Compare our results with, for example, the multi-state sentencing data reported
in BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, TIME SERVED IN PRISON 3 (1984).
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ated was 47.6 months). Almost all of the remaining defendants
were placed on probation (32.1 percent of those found guilty; the
median length of probation sentence imposed was 24.4 months).
Overall, then, our evaluation of the flow of 844 cases that came
to the attention of Felony Division prosecutors in Dade County dur-
ing 1981 reveals that cases involving juvenile defendants are taken
quite seriously by both prosecutors and the criminal courts. Only
26.9 percent failed to reach a trial or plea entry stage of processing.
This appears to compare favorably with other legal process studies
conducted in other jurisdictions." 1 0 In the recent and very large Bo-
land examination of case processing, for example, roughly one-half
of all felony arrests examined never reached a trial or plea entry
stage."' We attribute the much lower level of attrition reported
here largely to the fact that our cases were "double-screened" (i.e.,
once by prosecutors in the Juvenile Division and later by prosecu-
tors in the Felony Division). The same comparability appears to ex-
ist regarding other phases of processing, such as probability of a
finding of guilt and imposition of sentences involving either proba-
tion or incarceration.' 12
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
Juvenile law in Florida and elsewhere is in the midst of what
amounts to a revolutionary period of change. Beginning by no later
than the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Kent v.
United States' 13 in 1966, the appellate courts consistently have held
that juveniles must be accorded most-though certainly not all-of
the due process rights that are accorded adult defendants. Such
guarantees stem from, first, a conviction that due process protec-
tions should and must attach to any proceeding that can culminate
in deprivations of liberty and, second, that the juvenile justice sys-
tem has never been able to demonstrate that its claim to the broadly
discretionary and informally exercised powers associated with the
I 10 See, e.g., B. BOLAND, E. BRADY, H. TYSON &J. BASSLER, THE PROSECUTION OF FEL-
ONY ARRESTS 1979 (1983); J. EISENSTEIN & H. JACOB, FELONY JUSTICE: AN ORGANIZA-
TIONAL ANALYSIS OF CRIMINAL COURTS (1977); J. JACOBY, THE PROSECUTOR'S CHARGING
DECISION: A POLICY PERSPECTIVE (1977); K. WILLIAMS, FELONY ARRESTS: THEIR PROSE-
CUTION AND DISPOSITION IN NEW YORK CITY'S COURTS (1977); Forst, Prosecution and Sen-
tencing, in CRIME AND PUBLIC POLICY 165 (J. Wilson ed. 1983); Zeisel, The Disposition of
Felony Arrests, 1981 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 407.
111 B. BOLAND, E. BRADY, H. TYSON & J. BASSLER, supra note 110; Forst, supra note
110.
112 B. BOLAND, E. BRADY, H. TYSON &J. BASSLER, supra note 110, especially at 34-49,
for it is at that point that Boland et al. present detailed statistical data regarding case flow
on an offense specific basis.
113 383 U.S. 541.
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parens patriae doctrine has resulted in an effective delivery of benefi-
cial treatment.1 14 When this period ofjudicial activism appeared to
have run its course, and also as the magnitude of the problems
posed by serious crimes committed by juveniles began to attract na-
tional attention, legislative initiatives further eroded the powers of
juvenile courts by redefining the age at which jurisdiction over
juveniles was granted to criminal courts and/or granting prosecu-
tors broad discretionary powers to select the forum within which
they would present their charges.
Reactions to these judicial and legislative efforts have been stri-
dent. Many advocates of a traditional system ofjuvenile justice have
been especially hostile in their response to both judicial and legisla-
tive initiatives. Invoking the concept of parens patriae as well as as-
serting their continuing conviction that the purposes of both justice
and proper treatment of juvenile offenders are best served by per-
mitting juvenile court judges to pursue their work in a highly flexi-
ble and informal fashion that permits them to remain in the parental
role many have come to favor, the predictions these advocates make
about the future of the juvenile justice system are bleak and somber.
Such predictions warrant the most careful consideration.
Juveniles are precisely what the term implies. They are children.
They are not adults. Criminal law has granted full recognition to
this fact for hundreds of years. 1" 5 The authors' view, however, is
that the choices before the legal system today do not demand that a
choice between black and white categories must be made. The fact
that juveniles are not adults does not provide a sound constitutional
rationale for depriving them of fundamental rights to due process
and equal protection of law. Further, according juvenile defendants
such rights does not require the adoption of a rigid and inflexible
system of justice that undermines the ability of any sentencing au-
thority to take into account both the characteristics of the defendant
and the seriousness of the defendant's conduct when the time
comes for the selection of an appropriate case disposition.
114 Regarding due process guarantees, it should be noted that judicial opinions place
rather extreme limitations on the contexts within which relatively complete due process
protections will be accorded juveniles. Such protections, subsequent to the holdings of
the Supreme Court in such landmark decisions as Kent v. United States, In re Gault, In re
Winship, and Breed v.Jones, attach to juvenile defendants after they have been charged
with unlawful acts. In other contexts, including those that constitute a clear threat to the
liberty interests ofjuveniles, constitutional protections remain at a minimum level. See,
e.g., Schall v. Martin, 104 S. Ct. 2403 (1984); Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979);
Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979). Regarding the ineffectiveness of treatment and
rehabilitative efforts in both the juvenile and the criminal justice systems, see supra note
38.
115 See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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Second, were one to argue that the juvenile justice system has
earned the right to broader discretionary powers and the conse-
quent diminution of due process rights accorded juvenile defend-
ants, then one would be injecting a different meaning into the term
"earned" than seems appropriate. Little or no empirical evidence
exists that reveals any correlation whatsoever between the scope of
discretionary powers granted those working within the juvenile jus-
tice system and the likelihood that the stated objectives of that sys-
tem will be achieved.1 16
Third, it is clear that legal policies permitting juveniles to fall
within the jurisdiction of criminal rather that juvenile courts need
not and indeed do not create a context within which dispositional
alternatives become limited. Recent modifications in Florida law
that grant criminal courts broad dispositional alternatives when they
deal with juvenile defendants-considerably broader alternatives
than those that are available to any juvenile court judge-clearly
prove this point.
Fourth, an unfortunate reality of everyday life in contemporary
society is that there is a category of serious juvenile offenders whose
amenability to treatment within the juvenile justice system is low
and whose threat to the lives and property of others is demonstrably
high. The juvenile justice system becomes impotent when it en-
counters this arguably small portion of the juvenile offender popula-
tion. Moreover, a strong argument can be made that the mingling
of this category of offenders in typical types of juvenile treatment
programs may undermine the ability of those programs to deal ef-
fectively with more frequently encountered types of delinquents.
Taking all of these factors into account, the reasons to support
the vast majority of adjustments that have been made in Florida's
juvenile law become substantial. Although both the statewide and
the Dade County data that we have presented show that only a small
fraction of juveniles who are alleged to have engaged in unlawful
conduct will have their cases disposed of by criminal rather than ju-
venile courts, the adjustments we have described increase rather
than decrease the range of options available to those responsible for
processing juvenile cases. Further, when juvenile cases are moved
into the adult system, two very important things happen: (1) they
immediately are granted the full range of rights to due process and
equal protection of law (as opposed to the more narrowly defined
set of rights accorded them within the juvenile justice system); and
II I( See supra note 38.
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(2) the range of sentencing alternatives from which criminal court
sentencing authorities may choose also expands considerably.
Finally, our empirical analysis of juvenile cases disposed of by
criminal courts in Dade County during 1981 demonstrates, on the
one hand, that they are not defined as trivial matters by Felony Divi-
sion prosecutors and, on the other hand, that the ultimate disposi-
tions accorded convicted defendants by Dade County criminal
courts is neither remarkably harsh nor lenient given the offenses,
prior records, and other characteristics of the juvenile defendants.
The implication of all of this is clear. On the level of theory or
philosophy, reasonable people can and do differ widely regarding
the image they have regarding both the nature of juvenile offenses
and the role ofjuvenile courts. In a better and a more nearly perfect
world, perhaps it would be possible to translate the traditionalparens
patriae philosophy upon which the initial juvenile courts were based
into sound and effective legal practice. Perhaps, as advocates of an
entirely separate and very different juvenile justice system continue
to contend, the placement of limits on the powers of the juvenile
court is premature and we should wait longer, invest more re-
sources, recruit more sophisticated personnel, and so on.
In reality, however, we must deal reasonably and fairly with
what is rather than with what might be. To deal reasonably does not
mean and has not meant pretending that juvenile and adult offend-
ers are indistinguishable from one another. It does not mean and
has not meant contending that the entire juvenile justice system
must be dismantled. It does not mean and has not meant substitut-
ing rigidity and punitiveness for flexibility and benevolence. At
least in Florida, what one finds is the creation of a three-tier system
of justice. The vast majority of juveniles enter and never leave the
first tier, which involves a juvenile justice system within which de-
fendants are accorded substantial due process rights. In the third
tier we find a more or less traditional criminal justice system, a sys-
tem that is explicitly committed first to retributive punishment and
only second to rehabilitation. But there is also a very non-tradi-
tional second tier, and it has been the object of the bulk of our anal-
ysis and commentary. There we find a very unusual blending of
features of both the traditional juvenile and the traditional criminal
justice systems. Explicitly designed for a particular category of the
juvenile offender population-a category that is defined still more
specifically by formal guidelines developed by the Dade County
State Attorney's Office-this intermediate tier has the mandate of at
once being attentive to the needs ofjuvenile defendants and to pub-
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lic safety as well as doing so within the context of a fully adversary
system of justice.
None of what we have said at any point in our analysis should
be interpreted as a reflection of our ignorance of one fundamental
problem that could quite easily erode away altogether any potential
benefits of adjustments in juvenile law of the type one finds today in
Florida. Specifically, the fairness, the integrity, and the utility of the
legal provisions we have described depends very heavily-arguably
too heavily-on the willingness of prosecutors to create and then to
follow meaningful guidelines designed to transform their discretion-
ary powers from reflections of mere individual judgment to reflec-
tions of reasoned and mature administrative policy. Whenever, as is
the case today in Florida, the law itself invests broad discretionary
powers in prosecutors, the potential for the abusive exercise-
whether intended or unintended-of those powers also broaden.
Very significantly, moreover, there is a truly awesome differ-
ence in our legal system between the potential for abuse of judicial
and of prosecutorial powers. Many if not most of the powers vested
in the judiciary are exercised in open court and, at least in relative
terms, those offended by the exercise of judicial discretion have ac-
cess to various avenues of appeal. The same is far from true with
regard to the exercise of prosecutorial powers. Those powers are
exercised in contexts that commonly are shielded from public scru-
tiny. They equahy often reflect the preferences of individual and
sometimes inexperienced prosecutors rather than officially promul-
gated administrative guidelines devised by senior and experienced
personnel-and this is most particularly true with regard to the na-
tion's juvenile court prosecutors. Even when guidelines do exist,
mechanisms for effectively monitoring compliance with them sel-
dom exist. Finally, appellate attacks on prosecutorial decisions are
almost doomed to fail in all but cases involving the most grievous
abuses. Thus, whether for better or for worse, the fact is that the
most peculiar feature of our juvenile and criminal justice process is
that it involves a fairly elaborate set of checks and balances on the
conduct and the decisions of all but one set of actors: prosecutors.
We end this analysis, then, by recognizing an irony in recent
developments in juvenile law that should create much tension in the
minds of all who are concerned with juvenile justice. In Kent and in
Gault and in Winship and elsewhere, appellate courts have contended
that the due process rights of juveniles deserve and must be ac-
corded respect. While many find it difficult to see such a commit-
ment to due process rights in some recent holdings of the United
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States Supreme Court, 117 the fact remains that those appearing
before our juvenile courts today enjoy vastly greater protections
than did their counterparts of only two decades ago. The Bill of
Rights is a document that school children have been required to
read since its ratification in 1791. That they had to wait more than a
century and a half before they could depend upon its guarantees in
their everyday lives stands as an historical fact that is a source of
embarrassment to many of us. But would the embarrassment not
become intolerable were we to learn in years to come that the Star
Chamber of the juvenile court alluded to by Justice Fortas in
Gault" 8 had been displaced by nothing firmer than the even more
unbridled discretion of prosecutors?
117 See supra note 54.
118 See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
